With its rich set of conceptual, analytical and algorithmic tools, game theory has emerged as providing a versatile and effective framework for addressing issues of resilience, reliability and security in networked systems, particularly from a strategic point of view. This 2-hour expository talk will introduce the key elements of this modeling paradigm, and discuss various game-theoretic as well as control-theoretic solution concepts of direct relevance to this topical area. It will cover efficiency (or inefficiency) of these solutions within a non-cooperative mode of decision-making, their sensitivity to imprecision in modeling, and ways of coping with the presence of strategic adversaries. Further, the role of incentive (or disincentive) mechanisms in mitigating or totally eliminating the adverse effects of inefficiency, sensitivity, and adversarial impact will be discussed. The presentation will also introduce several specific examples of games with adversarial elements within the contexts of communication, computer and sensor networks, and cyber-physical systems.
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